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I.  Introduction 
The central role that employers play in financing health care remains a distinctive feature of 
the U.S. health care system, and the provision of health insurance through the workplace has 
important implications well beyond its role as source of health care financing.  Currently, as it has 
for the last half century, employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) dominates the US health insurance 
landscape.  For example, in 2007, over 60 percent of the non-elderly population was covered by 
ESI, representing 90.1 percent of all private coverage (Fronstin 2007).  Most employers provide 
health insurance to their workers and approximately 90 percent of full-time private sector 
employees work at establishments that offer coverage.
1  
Apart from its importance in financing health care — private health insurance, dominated 
by ESI, accounts for two-fifths of personal health care spending — ESI significantly affects a 
variety of labor market outcomes.  Health insurance contributes to individual and household 
decisions to participate in the labor market, to work full or part time, to obtain particular types of 
jobs, and to engage in self-employed entrepreneurial activities.  ESI obtained by retired employees 
remains a valued post-employment benefit that influences retirement decisions.  For employers, 
ESI remains an important inducement to attract workers in highly competitive labor markets.  
 





Despite its prominence in health insurance markets and partly because of its importance in 
household coverage and employment decisions, long-standing concerns and recent developments 
have once again made the employment-based health insurance system the subject of intense 
scrutiny and debate.  At issue is whether ESI can retain its primacy in an era of striking changes in 
labor markets and employment relationships, growing international competition and globalization, 
stagnant employee earnings, fiscal uncertainty for national and state economies, and above all, the 
continuing rise in health care costs.   
In this paper, we consider the “goodness of fit” of ESI in the current economic and health 
insurance environments and in light of prospects for a vigorous national debate over shape of 
health care reform.  The issue that we explore is whether ESI can have a viable role in health 
system reform efforts or whether such coverage will need to be significantly modified or even 
abandoned as reform seeks to address important issues in the efficient provision and equitable 
distribution of health insurance coverage.  
 
II. Setting the Stage 
Key Historical Developments 
Although employers in a few industries (notably railroad and mining) in the late 19
th 
century provided direct health services to their employees through payroll deductions, and several 
other employers and labor unions provided sick benefits to their employees and members, the link 
between health insurance and the workplace most appropriately dates to the origins of group health 





                                                
formed when a group of Dallas school teachers contracted with Baylor University hospital to 
provide up to 21 days of inpatient care for a fixed annual payment of $6.00.  The link between 
employment and private health insurance was strengthened during World War II when in1943 the 
War Labor Board ruled that controls over wages and prices imposed by the 1942 Stabilization Act 
did not apply to fringe benefits such as health insurance. In response to this ruling, many 
employers used insurance benefits to attract and retain scarce labor.  In 1948 and 1949, the 
National Labor Relations Board provided further impetus to workplace coverage by ruling that 
health insurance and other employee welfare plans were subject to collective bargaining.  Finally, 
in a landmark 1954 ruling, the Internal Revenue Service clarified an earlier administrative court 
ruling regarding the income tax status of ESI by exempting such benefits from income taxation and 
adding this provision to the tax code.
 2  Today, 162 million non-elderly Americans have ESI either 
in their own name or as a dependent, and for 2006, the tax subsidy from federal and state ESI tax 
exemptions is estimated to be $208.6 billion (Selden and Gray 2006).  
Despite these historical precedents and its apparent staying power, the employment-based 
insurance system has long been subject to criticism regarding the equity and efficiency of its 
financing and provision, its role in contributing to rising health care costs, and most recently, 
whether such coverage can remain affordable for workers and their families.  As a result, ESI may 
be increasingly vulnerable to changes viewed as necessary to address these concerns and to 
accommodate broader health care reform.   
Recent Trends in Cost and Coverage 
 
2 For more on the history of ESI, see Scofea (1994), Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI 





Data in Figure 1 illustrate present and ongoing concerns about the cost and affordability 
of ESI.  For most of the last two decades, year-to-year percentage increases in insurance premiums 
have grown faster than comparable measures of inflation and worker earnings, even during periods 
when premium growth was diminishing.  Although the share of premiums paid directly by 
employees has remained relatively constant over the past decade at around 15 percent for single 
coverage and 25 percent for family coverage, in dollar terms, average employee contribution for 
ESI more than doubled between 1996 and 2006—from $342 to $789 for single coverage from 
$1305 to $2890 for family coverage. 
In addition to and perhaps due to these cost pressures, the changing nature of 
employment relationships in the US have given some observers pause regarding the ability of ESI 
to remain a reliable source of coverage.  In an effort to economize on labor costs, employers have 
substantially changed the nature of the employment contract from a stable, long-term relationship 
to one encompassing shorter-term and more tenuous employment arrangements.  As a result, more 
workers are employed via temporary, short-term contracts, on a contingent basis, or though free-
lance employment arrangements, and these changes have altered the traditional role of the 
workplace as source of health insurance for many well-educated and professional employees 
(Swartz 2006; Price and Burgard 2008; Baicker and Chandra 2006).   
Figures 2 and 3 plot trends in ESI offers and coverage from 1996 to 2006.   Offer rates 





                                                
the US.
3  In 2000, 45 percent of establishments with less than 25 employees and roughly 85 
percent of establishments with 25 to 99 employees offered ESI.  The later years encompass a mild 
recession and subsequent period of moderate economic growth whose benefits were largely 
concentrated among high earning individuals.  By 2006, offer rates for establishments with less 
than 100 employees fell to roughly their 1996 levels.  The percentage of workers with coverage in 
their own name did not grow with employer offers during the boom years of the late 1990s, but 
rather stayed essentially constant at between 54 and 55 percent between 1996 and 2002, before 
declining slightly in each of the next four years.   
The combination of rising premiums and labor market changes has not only led to a 
decline in the overall rate of coverage, but has exacerbated pre-existing disparities in ESI coverage.  
In Table 1 we present data on the likelihood of being a full-year policyholder for the years 1996, 
2000, and 2005, tabulated by age, race/ethnicity, education, income, and health status.  The 
breakdown by age illustrates what Keenan, Cutler, and Chernew (2006) have described as the 
“graying” of ESI.  As they note, the combination of the changing age composition of the ESI pool 
together with rising premiums could further strain the ability of this source of coverage to offer 
risk protection.  For all race/ethnic groups, the percentage of adults who were ESI policyholders 
increased between 1996 and 2000, though for all groups but Asians these gains were eroded by 
2005.  In each of the years, the coverage rate was lowest for Hispanics.  One reason is that the 
Hispanic population includes a disproportionate share of non-citizens, who because of their lower 
 
3 Previous research using data from the MEPS household component has documented that the 
percentage of employers offering coverage was essentially the same in 1996 as in 1987 (Cooper 





levels of human capital are substantially less likely than citizens to work in jobs that offer 
insurance (Buchmueller et al. 2006; Reschovsky, et al. 2007).  The MEPS data also indicate steep 
gradients related to education and family income.    
In the last panel of Table 1 we cut the data by self-reported health status.  Standard 
economic models of the health insurance market suggest that when insurance premiums are not 
fully risk-rated, either because of private decisions by employers or government regulations, low-
risk consumers may drop out of the market rather than paying premiums that are high relative to 
their actuarial risk.  Some argue that this type of behavior can explain the low rates of coverage 
among younger workers.  The data on health status, however, provide little support for this adverse 
selection argument.  For all three years, ESI policyholder status is significantly higher among 
people who rate their health as good or excellent compared to higher risk individuals who say they 
are in fair or poor health.    
Because the data in Table 1 refer only to adult policyholders, they do not reflect large 
changes that have occurred over time in the pattern of insurance coverage within families.  The 
expansion of public insurance for children has altered the sources of coverage within families that 
have access to employment-based coverage.  Between 1997 and 2005, the percentage of single-
parent families in which all members had private insurance declined from 67.1 percent to 53.5 
percent, while that for married couples with children declined from 85.1 percent to 80.4 percent, 
with the decline in private coverage made up by public insurance (Vistnes and Schone 2008).     
As a final area of concern, we note that the provision of ESI by employers as a retirement 





                                                
reduced availability of this source of coverage is likely to affect the labor force and retirement 
decisions by near-elderly workers as few affordable insurance alternatives may exist prior 
obtaining Medicare at age 65. 
Overall, the data on costs, coverage, and the changing nature of employment present a 
mixed picture of the health of the ESI system and its prospects for the future.  Contrary to the 
claims made by some commentators that the employment-based system is “vanishing,” “ending,” 
or “dying” (see full quotes and references in Fronstin 2007), the system is not in free-fall.  
Interviews with ten very large employers conducted by the Employee Benefit Research Institute 
(EBRI) revealed that ESI is still considered a valuable tool in recruiting and retaining worker.  
None of the employers interviewed were on the verge of dropping health insurance, nor did that 
they expect other large employers would do so.  These impressions are consistent with the data 
showing that the percentage of firms offering health insurance as an employee benefit has 
remained remarkably stable over time.  For advantaged workers, policyholder and coverage status 
have remained fairly stable and while premiums have increased significantly, health insurance 
benefits as a percentage of total private sector compensation has increased only slightly, to 6.9 
percent in 2006 from 5.9 percent a decade earlier.
4   
  At the same time, there is real cause for concern.  Disparities in access to ESI and rates 
of coverage related to age, education, race, ethnicity and nativity are large and growing, and the 
gains in the likelihood of being full-year policyholder obtained during the latter part of the 1990s 
 
4 For the public sector, the level and growth in ESI costs are both higher.  In 2006, health 
benefits were 10.7 percent of compensation for government employees, up from 7.7 percent in 
1996.  These figures are from the National Compensation Survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau 





have deteriorated for a number of groups.  The employers surveyed by EBRI expressed concern 
that coverage availability at small employers could be in jeopardy and recognized that that the 
current ESI system must undergo significant changes to ensure accessible and affordable coverage, 
and this remains a key challenge for the employment-based system.     
  
III. The Basic Economics of ESI 
   In order to evaluate the role that ESI could play in a reformed health care system, it is 
instructive to review the advantages and disadvantages associated with this form of insurance 
provision. This exercise has the dual role of identifying those features of ESI that employees and 
employers value and that contribute to its prominence, as well as targeting those features of ESI 
that have been the subject of ongoing concern and pose challenges for reform. We list these 
elements in Table 2 and discuss each in turn. 
The Advantages of ESI 
Although managers and the business media often speak of the burden of health care costs 
falling on employers, economists typically assume that in the long run it is workers who pay for 
health benefits through reductions in wages or other employee benefits.  According to this 
economic viewpoint, the question “why do employers provide health insurance as an employee 
benefit?” should be rephrased as “why do so many workers choose to purchase insurance 
through their employers rather than directly in the individual insurance market?”  The answer is 





                                                
These savings flow from three main sources.  First, because important administrative 
costs vary with the number of contracts, rather than the number of individuals covered by a 
contract, there are substantial economies of scale associated with purchasing insurance through a 
group.  Second, because employer-sponsored groups were formed for reasons other than 
purchasing insurance and because they tend to be stable over time, employer provision greatly 
reduces the problem of adverse risk selection, which is a significant concern in the individual 
market.
5  As a result of these two factors, the administrative load for ESI is roughly half that for 
individually purchased policies: 15 to 20 percent compared to 30 to 40 percent (Swartz 2006).  The 
third source of cost advantage comes from the fact that employer payments for health insurance are 
exempt from federal and state income and Social Security payroll taxes.  On average, this 
exemption effectively reduces the price of insurance by between 35 and 40 percent (Gruber 2001; 
Bernard and Selden 2001). 
It is important to note that these advantages are not distributed evenly among all 
employers.  Cost savings from administrative economies of scale and more efficient risk pooling 
increase with group size.  Although the value of the tax exemption is not explicitly tied to size, 
because compensation tends to be higher in larger firms (Brown and Medoff 1989), this advantage 
is likely correlated with firm size as well.  These factors explain the strong relationship between 
firm size and employer offers documented in Figure 3.   
 
5 Although the notion that employer provision greatly mitigates the problem of adverse selection 
is widely accepted among economists, the theoretical basis for this belief is informal.  Recent 
papers by Bhattacharya and Vogt (2006) and Ellis and Ma (2007) attempt to develop models that 





Among employers offering ESI, there are also large size-related differences in the degree 
of employer involvement and the nature of benefits offered.  Roughly 80 percent of private sector 
establishments with 500 or more employees choose to self-insure rather than purchase coverage 
directly.  Since self-insured firms are exempt from state benefit mandates and other regulations, 
self-insuring provides employers a greater ability to shape the benefit package to the demands of 
their own employees and to actively manage costs.  Large firms are also more likely to offer a 
choice of insurance options and to support employees in choosing among those options.  Whereas 
over 70 percent of firms with 1000 or more employees offer a choice of health insurance options, 
only 12 percent of establishments with 50 or fewer employees offer more than one plan.  
Individuals who have a choice of plans tend to report higher levels of satisfaction with their 
coverage and the health care they receive (Schone and Cooper 2001).  Some very large firms have 
been quite active in pushing for innovation in both insurance and health care delivery.  A notable 
example is the Leapfrog Group, a coalition of large employers that has been on the forefront of the 
movement to improve health care quality and patient safety.   
Within firms, the advantages of employer sponsorship vary across employees.  Typically, 
health insurance premiums for large firms tend to be experience-rated over time.  But at a given 
point in time, employee premium contributions are generally community-rated.  That is, all 
employees within the workplace (or at least within broad job categories) typically pay the same 
amount for a health plan of given benefits and payment provisions.  As with any community rate, 
distributional consequences emerge that favor older and sicker workers and “penalize” younger 





                                                
face premiums well below their actuarial risk profiles, while younger workers face premiums that 
exceed their expected health spending.  The result is an implicit set of cross subsidies from 
younger and healthier workers to older and sicker workers.  Similarly, premiums do not typically 
increase continuously with family size but instead are set for discrete groupings—such as 
employee only, employee plus spouse, employee plus family—which creates cross subsidies from 
smaller to larger families (Gruber 2008).  
Such disparities in ESI premiums could be mediated if a young worker could expect to 
stay with a firm as s/he aged or as family size increased.  In this way, such a worker would 
willingly pay the higher community rate when young or subsidize larger families, knowing that 
s/he would be the beneficiary of such cross subsidies when older and/or with a larger family.  As 
we note below, one often overlooked feature of the tax treatment of health insurance is its 
moderating effect on the net losses obtained by younger healthier workers facing such community-
rated premiums.  Finally, it is also important to note that regulatory efforts have been extended to 
small firms to constrain the range of premiums they face when purchasing coverage and to address 
questionable insurer practices that yield excessive premiums.
6  
 
The Disadvantages of ESI 
Certain features of the current ESI system are less salutary and represent long-standing 
criticisms of employment-based coverage.  While the preferential tax treatment of ESI premiums 
increases the number of Americans with private insurance, it has also been criticized for promoting 
 
6 A number of studies examine the effects of state-level small group regulations.  Several 





excessive levels of insurance coverage, which in turn result in higher levels of health spending.  
The tax treatment of ESI also can be criticized on vertical equity grounds as well.  Because it 
comes in the form of an unlimited exemption, rather than a tax credit, the tax subsidy for ESI is 
regressive, flowing disproportionately to high income families both because they face higher 
marginal tax rates and because they tend to hold more expensive policies.   
While the tax treatment of ESI remains controversial, it is important to recognize that the 
tax subsidy may play a moderating role in reducing disparities in the monetary returns to enrolling 
in ESI.  As Monheit, Nichols, and Selden (1995/96) and Selden and Bernard (2004) show, 
differences in the net benefit to having ESI (defined as premiums less health plan payments) across 
households are significantly reduced once the value of the tax subsidy is included to offset full 
premium payments by workers (assuming workers bear the full incidence of employer 
contributions).  As a result, the tax subsidy promotes continued participation of certain types of 
households such as those with young and healthy families who provide much of the benefit flow to 
older and sicker enrollees.  In this way, as Enthoven and Singer (1996) have observed, the tax 
exclusion for ESI is “an important part of the glue that holds employment groups together as risk 
pools for purchasing health benefits” (page 199). 
Other criticisms of the ESI system focus on spillovers to the labor market.  The link 
between health insurance and the workplace may create inefficiencies by distorting the behavior of 
workers and employers, including their decisions to participate in the labor force, to work full or 
part time, and whether to hire part-time and part-year workers.  One distortion that has received 





                                                
consistently indicate that a large percentage of workers have stayed in a job that they wanted to 
leave for fear of giving up their health benefits,
7 though the evidence from academic studies is 
mixed.
 8  Other research suggests that the fact that employers typically provide health benefits only 
to full-time employees affects worker decisions about how many hours to work.
9 
Estimates suggest that the economic cost of job-lock is relatively small (Monheit and 
Cooper 1994; Gruber 2008).  Even if job-lock is a real source of inefficiency, an argument can be 
made that the problem stems from the non-group market.  If affordable non-group coverage were 
widely available, individuals who sought to change jobs (or to either not work or work for a small 
firm that doesn’t provide insurance) could be assured access to coverage.
10  Similarly, the well-
documented relationship between the availability of retiree health benefits and the propensity of 
workers to retire before they attain Medicare eligibility can be attributed in large part to the 
unattractiveness of the options available to “near-elderly” adults in the non-group market 
(Rogowsky and Karoly 2000; also see the review by Gruber and Madrian 2004).   
Whether or not ESI has a causal effect on job mobility, it is clear that the system does not 
work well for people who, for other reasons, have high rates of turnover.  This weakness is 
increasingly significant in light of long run trends in the labor market, such as a declining job 
security and increases in the number of independent contractors and other types of contingent 
 
7  For example, nearly half of the respondents to a 2008 survey said that they or one of their 
family members have had this experience (AFL-CIO 2008).   
8 For a comprehensive review of the literature in this area, see Gruber and Madrian (2004). 
9 See, for example, Buchmueller and Valletta (1999). 
10 A recent study by DeCicca (2008) suggests that a New Jersey regulation prohibiting insurer 
discrimination against high risk individuals contributed to an increase in self-employment in that 





work.  Even for workers who transition from one job to another without a spell in unemployment 
there are efficiency costs.  In addition to the transaction costs, the fact that job changes often lead 
to changes in insurance also reduces the incentive of workers, employers and insurers to invest in 
health and prevention (Herring 2006; Cebul et al. 2007; Fang and Gavazza 2007). 
 
IV. ESI and Health Insurance Reform 
In Figure 4, we present a schematic diagram describing alternative approaches to health 
care reform, which can be used to consider the implications that different strategies are likely to 
have for ESI.  The boxes to the right of health insurance expansion box acknowledge approaches 
that encompass implementation of a single-payer health insurance system and expansions of 
public coverage.  Although implementing a single-payer system has for many years received 
much attention in reform discussions, we agree with Gruber (2008) that it is highly unlikely that 
such a system will receive serious consideration given the vested interests of a private insurance 
system with annual revenues in excess of $500 billion.  Even if it were politically feasible, 
moving to a single-payer system would likely entail dismantling the current ESI system.  
Therefore, we do not consider this class of expansion strategies in any detail.   
Public sector expansions would not necessarily eliminate ESI as we know it.  Rather, this 
approach would likely focus on certain vulnerable populations, as in the recent efforts to expand 
income eligibility and allow parental enrollment in the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP), and in proposals to allow some population groups to buy into Medicare or 





                                                
approach, political factors represent a significant constraint for this class of strategies.  We 
expect that ideological disagreements over expansions of public coverage beyond originally 
targeted at low-income populations are likely to limit their consideration as broad strategies.  
Even if these political barriers could be overcome, the immediate effects of these types of 
policies on ESI would likely be indirect.  Most notably, increased eligibility for public insurance 
may “crowd out” private coverage.  While such effects may reduce private coverage, incremental 
public insurance expansions by themselves would not materially alter the nature of ESI or group 
insurance markets.  Therefore, we do not offer a detailed consideration of this approach either.   
We focus primarily on strategies in which private insurance remains the predominant 
mechanism for financing health care.  The diagram shows that among private-sector expansions, 
there is a basic dichotomy between voluntary and mandated approaches.   
Mandatory Approaches 
Considering mandatory coverage (the right-hand side of the figure), there is a further 
dichotomy between individual and employer-based mandates.  An employer mandate could be a 
strict requirement of doing business in a state, such as in Hawaii, or could have an element of 
voluntarism, as in the “pay or play” featured in more recent proposals, including the Clinton 
Administration’s proposed Health Security Act, or legislation that was enacted in California in 
2003, but repealed in a referendum the following year.
11 
Hawaii’s experience offers the best evidence on the potential for an employer mandate to 
increase insurance coverage.  Its mandate legislation, known as the Prepaid Health Care Act 
 
11 Employer mandate legislation was also enacted but later repealed Massachusetts (in 1989) and 





(PHCA) was passed in 1974, but because of legal challenges was not permanently implemented 
until 1983.  Although the law’s initial impact on coverage was small, over time ESI coverage has 
remained relatively constant in Hawaii rather than declining as in other states.  By 2005, the 
percentage of private sector workers with ESI in their own name was 13 percentage points higher 
in Hawaii than in the rest of the U.S.; for less skilled workers the gap is even greater (Buchmueller, 
DiNardo and Valletta 2009).  Hawaii’s experience suggests that requiring employers to offer 
insurance can significantly increase coverage, while at the same time showing that employer 
mandates alone cannot achieve universal coverage.  While non-elderly Hawaiians are significantly 
more likely to be insured than their counterparts in other states, nearly 9 percent remain uninsured. 
The line joining the individual and employer mandates represents the fact that a 
combined approach has been proposed in a few states, and has been enacted as part of 
Massachusetts’ recent landmark reforms.  While an individual mandate can be seen as the 
cornerstone of the Massachusetts legislation, the reforms do not represent a move to replace ESI 
or diminish the role of employers.  One reason is that the individual mandate can be satisfied by 
obtaining coverage through an employer.  In addition, the Massachusetts law imposes a “pay or 
play” requirement on employers: those that do not provide health benefits must pay a “fair share” 
contribution toward the cost of their employees’ insurance.  Early evaluations of the 
Massachusetts reforms paint an encouraging picture (Long 2008, Long et al. 2009).  Uninsured 
rates among working adults have declined by nearly half (from 13 percent to 7 percent) and 
survey respondents reported improvements in access to care, reductions in high out-of-pocket 





                                                
The Massachusetts plan can be seen as a pragmatic response to the strengths and 
weaknesses of the ESI system.  It implicitly recognizes that for a large number of workers and their 
families, the system works fairly well, and therefore does not attempt to alter the basic incentives 
leading to the dominance of ESI.
12  Large employers in Massachusetts have no incentive to drop 
health benefits nor do their employees have an incentive to drop out of the group to purchase 
insurance as individuals.  At the same time, the Massachusetts plan recognizes that mandates on 
individuals, rather than employers, are likely to be more effective in increasing coverage and less 
likely to induce labor market distortions.   
A key element of the Massachusetts plan is the Commonwealth Connector, a state agency 
established to manage the state’s small group and non-group insurance markets.  In many respects, 
the Connector replicates the services provided by the human resource departments of very large 
firms or the Office of Personnel Management in the case of the FEHBP.  The Connector 
determines the menu of health plans available to individuals and small employers that choose to 
join the pool and regulates the benefits and underwriting policies of these plans.  Employees of 
large private firms or the Federal government are not charged premiums based on their individual 
risk characteristics and cannot be denied coverage that is offered to their fellow employees.  
Similar rules apply to coverage obtained through the Connector.  
Laws that would mandate coverage would likely include exemptions.  These exemptions 
have important implications for coverage and economic welfare.  By compelling individuals to 
obtain coverage, some people will be forced to purchase a different mix of goods (more 
 





insurance, less of other things) than they would otherwise prefer and will therefore be made 
worse off.  Thus, those whose welfare losses are perceived as especially severe (e.g., individuals 
and families of fairly low economic status) may be exempt from the mandate and efforts may be 
made to enroll them in public coverage.  For others, subsidies are likely to be required over some 
income range in order to offset some of the welfare losses from a mandate imposed on those with 
weak health insurance preferences or other pressing financial obligations.  As regards subsidies, 
policymakers will have to decide between direct cash rebates for premiums paid, tax credits, or 
tax deductions. While the first two options differ only in the way the subsidies are administered, 
using tax deductions (as in President Bush’s insurance expansion proposal of January 2007) will 
make the subsidy regressive. 
Employer mandate proposals often include exemptions for small firms or firms 
employing a large proportion of low-wage workers.  Both types of exemptions recognize that 
unemployment may be an unintended consequence of an employer mandate should  employers 
of such firms be unable to fully absorb the cost of the mandate, or pass the cost onto low-wage 
workers in the form of reductions in wages or other benefits.  However, because uninsured 
workers are disproportionately low-wage workers employed in small firms, such exemptions can 
be problematic from the perspective of achieving universal coverage.  For example, as Baicker 
and Levy (2008) note, exempting firms with less than 25 workers could eliminate 45 percent of 





                                                
critical in helping to approach universal coverage and in forestalling any unintended 
employment effects due to employer responses to the mandate.
13  
Although mandated coverage is a legal requirement imposed on residents of specific 
jurisdictions, this alone will not guarantee participation levels consistent with desired enrollment. 
As Glied, Hartz and Giorgi (2007) point out, the effect of a mandate critically will depend up the 
level of enforcement and degree of penalties imposed for violation.  In this regard, early 
experience under the Massachusetts state mandate is instructive as relatively low penalties failed 
to induce individuals with weak preferences for health insurance to enroll in mandated coverage 
(Belluck 2007). 
Voluntary Approaches 
In contrast to mandates, voluntary measures (the left-hand side of the figure) seek to 
induce individuals to enroll in either type of coverage by reducing out-of-pocket premium costs 
through subsidies (i.e., tax credits or deductions) in the short term, and over the longer term, 
through more general efforts to eliminate inefficiencies the health care system and to contain 
health care costs.  Given the voluntary nature of these approaches, subsidy levels become critical 
and research suggests that substantial subsidies will be required to induce a desired enrollment 
response (e.g., Marquis and Long 1995).   
 
13 Baicker and Levy’s simulation of the employment effects of a generic employer mandate that 
does not include subsidies suggests that these employment effects may be small (224,000 
workers representing 4.5 percent of uninsured workers or 1.4 percent of workers at risk for 
unemployment) relative to the gain in coverage (15.7 million workers now insured). However, 
they note that such unemployment is likely to be concentrated among low-skilled and 





In principle, voluntary approaches to expanding coverage can also be applied to both 
non-group insurance and to ESI.  However, the most prominent examples of voluntary 
approaches are recent Republican proposals aimed at expanding non-group coverage.  These 
examples include proposals made by the Bush Administration, and John McCain’s proposal to 
replace the tax subsidy currently given to ESI with a refundable tax credit that could be used to 
partially defray the cost of purchasing insurance as an individual or through a voluntary 
association (Buchmueller et al. 2008).   
Replacing the open-ended tax exclusion with a refundable tax credit would address some 
of the inequities of the current system.  From the perspective of vertical equity, the tax 
expenditures would no longer flow disproportionately to higher income families.  Horizontal 
equity would be improved as people who obtain insurance outside the ESI system will now receive 
the same subsidy as people with ESI.  However, as noted, a cost of replacing the tax exclusion with 
a tax credit paid directly to individuals is a weakening of the “glue” holding the employment-based 
system together and the potential unraveling of this market.  As a result, such a policy change 
would increase inequities along other dimensions.   
A shift from group to non-group coverage would entail an increase in administrative 
costs.  Because many consumers would likely respond to this effective price increase by choosing 
plans with less comprehensive benefits, exposure to out-of-pocket medical expenses would 
increase as well.  Whether or not this is a positive development is a matter of perspective.  Plans 
like those promoted by the Bush Administration and by John McCain’s presidential campaign are 





                                                
patients are over-insured and therefore consume inefficiently high levels of services.  High 
deductible health savings accounts (HSAs) and other consumer-directed health plans (CDHPs) 
figure prominently in these Republican proposals.  While these products have been available for 
several years, they still represent a very small share of the group market.
14  Moreover, as survey 
data from the Employee Benefit Research Institute has revealed, enrollees’ satisfaction with 
consumer-directed insurance is not especially high, and some individuals have reported deferring 
or postponing care in response to the high out-of-pocket costs associated with such plans (Fronstin 
and Collins 2005).  Additionally, such health plans have important implications for equitable 
access to health care and equity in its financing (Rosenthal and Daniels 2006). 
Risk Selection under Mandatory and Voluntary Approaches 
The potential for adverse risk selection is a fundamental issue for private insurance 
markets and, by extension, for coverage expansion policies built around private coverage.  To the 
extent that mandates can achieve near-universal coverage, the problem of adverse selection is 
greatly reduced, though not eliminated.  If everyone is required to have insurance regardless of 
their expected need for health care, insurers have less reason to worry about consumers who seek 
coverage because they are sick.  Still, in the absence of risk-rated or adequately risk-adjusted 
premiums, incentives for insurers to seek good risks and shun bad ones will likely remain. 
Adverse selection is a much greater concern for policies aimed at expanding voluntary 
coverage, especially those aimed at increasing non-group coverage by voluntary means.  A major 
 
14 According to a 2006 employer survey, 4 percent of workers with ESI are enrolled in a CDHP.  
This is only one point higher than the market share of conventional indemnity plans (Claxton et 





                                                
shortcoming of contemporary non-group markets is that “high risk” consumers can face 
extremely high premium, restrictions on benefits and in many cases outright denials of coverage 
(Pollitz et al. 2001).
15  Roughly half of all states currently have laws that address aspects of 
market failure in the non-group market, including guaranteed issue and renewal requirements, 
constraints on pre-existing conditions, and limits on premium variation.  Some evidence suggests 
that these policies may have increased non-group coverage among high risks, while reducing 
coverage slightly among low risks, with varying consequences for overall coverage rates 
(Monheit et al. 2004; LoSasso and Lurie 2009).  This result illustrates a basic trade-off between 
the interests of high and low risk consumers that in the non-group market. 
Adverse selection is likely to be less of an issue for voluntary policies that seek to expand 
ESI coverage.  As noted, employer-sponsored groups, especially large ones, represent stable risk 
pools that mitigate insurer concerns about selection while protecting higher cost employees from 
a large financial burden.  Because risk pooling works less well for smaller firms, regulations 
governing insurer underwriting practices have developed for the small group market.  Nearly 
every state enacted such policies in the early 1990s.  The best evidence suggests that although 
these laws did not increase coverage as their proponents had hoped, they also did not cause small 
group markets to unravel, as many critics had predicted, although in some cases, unintended 
consequences for enrollment and premiums resulted (Buchmeller and DiNardo 2002; Monheit 
 
15 Individuals with chronic health conditions are most acutely affected by medical underwriting, 
though the practice is not limited to consumers most people would consider “sick.”  For 
example, according to recent media reports some non-group insurers deny coverage or charge 
substantially higher premiums to women who have previously given birth by C-section (Grady 





and Schone 2004; Simon 2005).  So, while these regulations can be criticized on various 
grounds, it is fair to say that neither cream-skimming nor adverse selection is a major problem in 
the employer-sponsored group market. 
   
V.  Concluding Remarks     
In sum, given the prominence of ESI and the interest of key stakeholders, it is highly 
unlikely that efforts to expand health insurance coverage will abandon such coverage.  Despite 
such entrenched support, however, there are some who believe that the inefficiencies and 
inequities of the current system are so significant that it is time to replace ESI for a system of 
individually-purchased coverage.  If ESI is to retain its position of prominence or serve as the 
focal point for health insurance expansions, there are four longstanding areas of concern which 
warrant important consideration.   
The first is portability.  Particularly in a time or recession, it is clear that a weakness of 
the current system is the way the gaps in coverage that occur when lose or change jobs or 
otherwise sever employment relationships.  Second, economists have long noted that the current 
tax treatment of ESI is both inefficient—because it encourages the purchase of more generous 
coverage—and inequitable—because the tax subsidy is distributed in a regressive fashion.  
While this remains a difficult political issue, there appears to be a growing willingness among 
policy makers to consider alternatives to the current tax exclusion policy.  Third, currently small 
employers are at a disadvantage with regard to the costs and types of insurance products they can 





sustainable role for ESI in health insurance expansions, and more generally, to ensure access to 
such coverage through sustainable income-related subsidies, will hinge critically on the ability of 
employers, insurers, and providers to actively work to contain health care costs. Achieving 
workable solutions to these problems is the key challenge that will confront the ESI system as it 
strives to maintain its relevance during the likely contentious debate over the nature of health 
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Figure 4: Anatomy of Health Insurance Reform 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
Table 1.  Likelihood of being a Full-Year Policyholder of ESI by Selected Characteristics, 
1996, 2000, and 2005: Persons Ages 19-64. 
 






All persons  40.3% (0.59)  42.4% (0.67)  39.3% (0.44) 
     
Age      
19-24  13.1% (1.09)  12.3% (0.88)  12.1% (0.84) 
25-34  40.3 (1.15)  42.8 (1.19)  38.7 (1.09) 
35-44  45.6 (1.03)  48.0 ((1.01)*  42.9 (0.94)* 
45-54  49.5 (1.01)  51.1 (1.07)  46.9 (0.86)* 
55-64  42.2 (1.38)  45.8 (1.27)*  46.0 (0.93)** 
     
Race/Ethnicity      
White  43.5 (0.71)  45.3 (0.70)*  42.8 (0.55) 
Black  35.2 (1.49)  40.5 (1.52)**   37.2 (1.07) 
Hispanic  26.3 (1.37)  29.2 (1.08)*  25.7 (0.86) 
Asian and other   34.8 (2.19)  34.6 (2.58)  35.8 (1.56) 
     
Years of education      
<12  19.7 (1.08)  19.5 (0.97)  17.9 (0.84) 
12  38.2 ((0.87)  39.7 (0.99)  37.4 (0.76) 
13-15  40.2 (1.14)  43.9 (1.07)**  38.7 (0.81) 
16 or more  55.3 (1.01)  59.3 (0.85)***  54.7 (0.92) 
     
Income       
Poor  6.7 (0.64)  7.6 (0.78)  5.6 (0.54) 
Near-poor  14.3 (1.32)  12.1 (1.75)  13.6 (1.27) 
Low income  26.5 (1.05)  25.9 (1.16)  22.2 (0.85)*** 
Middle income  45.0(0.88)  43.5 (0.90)  41.1 (0.73)*** 
High income  53.1 (0.73)  55.4 (0.85)**  53.3 (0.71) 
     
Health status      
Excellent  43.7 (0.86)   45.2 (0.93)  41.0 (0.82)** 
Very good  44.5 (0.92)  47.3 (0.81)**  43.5 (0.71) 
Good  38.1 (1.06)  39.3 (1.25)  38.6 (0.87) 
Fair or poor  23.4 ((1.24)  25.7 (1.15)  25.2 (1.16) 
     
Source: Authors’ tabulations of Medical Expenditure Panel Survey – Household Component for 
years 1996, 2000, and 2005. Income as a percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) defined as 
follows: poor (≤ FPL); near-poor (> FPL through 1.25*FPL); low income (>1.25*FPL through 
2.00*FPL); middle income (>2.00*FPL through 4.00*FPL0); high income (> 4.00*FPL).  
•  p <0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 for comparisons to 1996 policyholder rates. 
 
 











o  Administrative economies of scale. 
o  Reduced risk of adverse selection. 
o  Tax deduction for employer 
contributions. 
o  Large firms offer choice of health 
insurance plans. 
o  Innovation in benefits design and health 
care delivery. 
o  Community-rated premiums within 
firms. 
 
o  Efficiency and equity issues in the provision of 
coverage:  
  Tax treatment of ESI. 
  Differences in firm size. 
o  Concerns over portability of coverage: 
  Job mobility (“job lock”). 
  Investments in health & prevention. 
o  Gaps in coverage: 
  Worker human capital. 
  Contingent and contract workers. 
o  Distortions of household labor market decisions: 
  Labor force participation. 
  Hours of work. 
  Retirement decisions 
 
 
 
 